0ad/source/lobby/pkcs5_pbkdf2.cpp
historic_bruno 62a10ab938 Fixes Windows build.
Fixes UPnP error handling to be more correct and conventional, refs
#2305

This was SVN commit r14352.
2013-12-15 01:02:26 +00:00

101 lines
3.0 KiB
C++

/**
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Bergamini <damien.bergamini@free.fr>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
// This file is based loosly off libutil/pkcs5_pbkdf2.c in OpenBSD.
#include "precompiled.h"
#include "pkcs5_pbkdf2.h"
#include "sha.h"
static void hmac_sha256(unsigned char (&digest)[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE],
const unsigned char* text, size_t text_len,
const unsigned char* key, size_t key_len)
{
SHA256 hash;
unsigned char tk[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE]; // temporary key incase we need to pad the key with zero unsigned chars
if (key_len > SHA_DIGEST_SIZE)
{
hash.update(key, key_len);
hash.finish(tk);
key = tk;
key_len = SHA_DIGEST_SIZE;
}
unsigned char k_pad[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE];
memset(k_pad, 0, sizeof k_pad);
memcpy(k_pad, key, key_len);
for (int i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
k_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
hash.init();
hash.update(k_pad, SHA_DIGEST_SIZE);
hash.update(text, text_len);
hash.finish(digest);
memset(k_pad, 0, sizeof k_pad);
memcpy(k_pad, key, key_len);
for (int i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
k_pad[i] ^= 0x5c;
hash.init();
hash.update(k_pad, SHA_DIGEST_SIZE);
hash.update(digest, SHA_DIGEST_SIZE);
hash.finish(digest);
}
int pbkdf2(unsigned char (&output)[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE],
const unsigned char* key, size_t key_len,
const unsigned char* salt, size_t salt_len,
unsigned rounds)
{
unsigned char asalt[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE + 4], obuf[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE], d1[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE], d2[SHA_DIGEST_SIZE];
if (rounds < 1 || key_len == 0 || salt_len == 0)
return -1;
if (salt_len > SHA_DIGEST_SIZE) salt_len = SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; // length cap for the salt
memset(asalt, 0, salt_len);
memcpy(asalt, salt, salt_len);
for (unsigned count = 1; ; ++count)
{
asalt[salt_len + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
asalt[salt_len + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
asalt[salt_len + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
asalt[salt_len + 3] = count & 0xff;
hmac_sha256(d1, asalt, salt_len + 4, key, key_len);
memcpy(obuf, d1, SHA_DIGEST_SIZE);
for (unsigned i = 1; i < rounds; i++)
{
hmac_sha256(d2, d1, SHA_DIGEST_SIZE, key, key_len);
memcpy(d1, d2, SHA_DIGEST_SIZE);
for (unsigned j = 0; j < SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; j++)
obuf[j] ^= d1[j];
}
memcpy(output, obuf, SHA_DIGEST_SIZE);
key += SHA_DIGEST_SIZE;
if (key_len < SHA_DIGEST_SIZE)
break;
key_len -= SHA_DIGEST_SIZE;
};
return 0;
}