1
1
forked from 0ad/0ad
0ad/source/lib/secure_crt.cpp
janwas bc519cc671 prevent crash if lib_error association code is called before _cinit (happens if there's a problem with whrt init).
instead of std::map, use a linked list of static LibErrorAssociation
instances. (also simplifies the process of registering error
codes/descriptions)

module_init: remove warning (happens in normal operation)
win: add fixed InterlockedExchangePointer definition
mahaf: no longer warn if stopping the service failed because it wasn't
started

This was SVN commit r5104.
2007-05-28 09:20:55 +00:00

238 lines
7.6 KiB
C++

/**
* =========================================================================
* File : secure_crt.cpp
* Project : 0 A.D.
* Description : partial implementation of VC8's secure CRT functions
* =========================================================================
*/
// license: GPL; see lib/license.txt
#include "precompiled.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "secure_crt.h"
// we were included from wsecure_crt.cpp; skip all stuff that
// must only be done once.
#ifndef WSECURE_CRT
ERROR_ASSOCIATE(ERR::STRING_NOT_TERMINATED, "Invalid string (no 0 terminator found in buffer)", -1);
#endif
// written against http://std.dkuug.dk/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/docs/n1031.pdf .
// optimized for size - e.g. strcpy calls strncpy with n = SIZE_MAX.
// since char and wide versions of these functions are basically the same,
// this source file implements generic versions and bridges the differences
// with these macros. wsecure_crt.cpp #defines WSECURE_CRT and
// includes this file.
#ifdef WSECURE_CRT
# define tchar wchar_t
# define T(string_literal) L ## string_literal
# define tnlen wcsnlen
# define tncpy_s wcsncpy_s
# define tcpy_s wcscpy_s
# define tncat_s wcsncat_s
# define tcat_s wcscat_s
# define tcmp wcscmp
# define tcpy wcscpy
# define tprintf_s swprintf_s
# define vtnprintf vswprintf // private
# define tfopen_s _wfopen_s
# define tfopen _wfopen // private
#else
# define tchar char
# define T(string_literal) string_literal
# define tnlen strnlen
# define tncpy_s strncpy_s
# define tcpy_s strcpy_s
# define tncat_s strncat_s
# define tcat_s strcat_s
# define tcmp strcmp
# define tcpy strcpy
# define tprintf_s sprintf_s
# define vtnprintf vsnprintf // private
# define tfopen_s fopen_s
# define tfopen fopen // private
#endif // #ifdef WSECURE_CRT
// return <retval> and raise an assertion if <condition> doesn't hold.
// usable as a statement.
#define ENFORCE(condition, err_to_warn, retval) STMT(\
if(!(condition)) \
{ \
DEBUG_WARN_ERR(err_to_warn); \
return retval; \
} \
)
// raise a debug warning if <len> is the size of a pointer.
// catches bugs such as: tchar* s = ..; tcpy_s(s, sizeof(s), T(".."));
// if warnings get annoying, replace with debug_printf. usable as a statement.
//
// currently disabled due to high risk of false positives.
#define WARN_IF_PTR_LEN(len)\
/*
STMT( \
if(len == sizeof(char*)) \
debug_warn("make sure string buffer size is correct");\
)*/
// skip our implementation if already available, but not the
// self-test and the t* defines (needed for test).
#if !HAVE_SECURE_CRT
// return length [in characters] of a string, not including the trailing
// null character. to protect against access violations, only the
// first <max_len> characters are examined; if the null character is
// not encountered by then, <max_len> is returned.
size_t tnlen(const tchar* str, size_t max_len)
{
// note: we can't bail - what would the return value be?
debug_assert(str != 0);
WARN_IF_PTR_LEN(max_len);
size_t len;
for(len = 0; len < max_len; len++)
if(*str++ == '\0')
break;
return len;
}
// copy at most <max_src_chars> (not including trailing null) from
// <src> into <dst>, which must not overlap.
// if thereby <max_dst_chars> (including null) would be exceeded,
// <dst> is set to the empty string and ERANGE returned; otherwise,
// 0 is returned to indicate success and that <dst> is null-terminated.
//
// note: padding with zeroes is not called for by NG1031.
int tncpy_s(tchar* dst, size_t max_dst_chars, const tchar* src, size_t max_src_chars)
{
// the MS implementation returns EINVAL and allows dst = 0 if
// max_dst_chars = max_src_chars = 0. no mention of this in
// 3.6.2.1.1, so don't emulate that behavior.
ENFORCE(dst != 0, ERR::INVALID_PARAM, EINVAL);
ENFORCE(max_dst_chars != 0, ERR::INVALID_PARAM, ERANGE);
*dst = '\0'; // in case src ENFORCE is triggered
ENFORCE(src != 0, ERR::INVALID_PARAM, EINVAL);
WARN_IF_PTR_LEN(max_dst_chars);
WARN_IF_PTR_LEN(max_src_chars);
// copy string until null character encountered or limit reached.
// optimized for size (less comparisons than MS impl) and
// speed (due to well-predicted jumps; we don't bother unrolling).
tchar* p = dst;
size_t chars_left = std::min(max_dst_chars, max_src_chars);
while(chars_left != 0)
{
// success: reached end of string normally.
if((*p++ = *src++) == '\0')
return 0;
chars_left--;
}
// which limit did we hit?
// .. dst, and last character wasn't null: overflow.
if(max_dst_chars <= max_src_chars)
{
*dst = '\0';
ENFORCE(0, ERR::BUF_SIZE, ERANGE);
}
// .. source: success, but still need to null-terminate the destination.
*p = '\0';
return 0;
}
// copy <src> (including trailing null) into <dst>, which must not overlap.
// if thereby <max_dst_chars> (including null) would be exceeded,
// <dst> is set to the empty string and ERANGE returned; otherwise,
// 0 is returned to indicate success and that <dst> is null-terminated.
int tcpy_s(tchar* dst, size_t max_dst_chars, const tchar* src)
{
return tncpy_s(dst, max_dst_chars, src, SIZE_MAX);
}
// append <src> to <dst>, which must not overlap.
// if thereby <max_dst_chars> (including null) would be exceeded,
// <dst> is set to the empty string and ERANGE returned; otherwise,
// 0 is returned to indicate success and that <dst> is null-terminated.
int tncat_s(tchar* dst, size_t max_dst_chars, const tchar* src, size_t max_src_chars)
{
ENFORCE(dst != 0, ERR::INVALID_PARAM, EINVAL);
ENFORCE(max_dst_chars != 0, ERR::INVALID_PARAM, ERANGE);
// src is checked in tncpy_s
// WARN_IF_PTR_LEN not necessary: both max_dst_chars and max_src_chars
// are checked by tnlen / tncpy_s (respectively).
const size_t dst_len = tnlen(dst, max_dst_chars);
if(dst_len == max_dst_chars)
{
*dst = '\0';
ENFORCE(0, ERR::STRING_NOT_TERMINATED, ERANGE);
}
tchar* const end = dst+dst_len;
const size_t chars_left = max_dst_chars-dst_len;
int ret = tncpy_s(end, chars_left, src, max_src_chars);
// if tncpy_s overflowed, we need to clear the start of our string
// (not just the appended part). can't do that by default, because
// the beginning of dst is not changed in normal operation.
if(ret != 0)
*dst = '\0';
return ret;
}
// append <src> to <dst>, which must not overlap.
// if thereby <max_dst_chars> (including null) would be exceeded,
// <dst> is set to the empty string and ERANGE returned; otherwise,
// 0 is returned to indicate success and that <dst> is null-terminated.
//
// note: implemented as tncat_s(dst, max_dst_chars, src, SIZE_MAX)
int tcat_s(tchar* dst, size_t max_dst_chars, const tchar* src)
{
return tncat_s(dst, max_dst_chars, src, SIZE_MAX);
}
int tprintf_s(tchar* buf, size_t max_chars, const tchar* fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
int len = vtnprintf(buf, max_chars, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
return len;
}
#if OS_WIN || !defined(WSECURE_CRT)
// FIXME this doesn't work in the wchar_t version, for the platforms where it's
// supposed to do good, since wfopen is microsoft-specific.
errno_t tfopen_s(FILE** pfile, const tchar* filename, const tchar* mode)
{
*pfile = NULL;
FILE* file = tfopen(filename, mode);
if(!file)
return ENOENT;
*pfile = file;
return 0;
}
#endif
#endif // #if !HAVE_SECURE_CRT